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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES
David P. Schack*
In 1890 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published
an article, entitled The Right of Privacy,1 in the Harvard Law Re-
view. Using this concept of a right of privacy, the courts slowly be-
gan to develop a cause of action based on a right of privacy.' Seventy
years later Dean William L. Prosser organized the types of privacy
rights into four separate categories in an article entitled Privacy."
Although he analyzed the right of privacy in detail, Prosser devoted
only one sentence to the application of the right of privacy to busi-
ness entities: "It seems to be generally agreed that the right of pri-
vacy is one pertaining only to individuals, and that a corportation or
a partnership cannot claim it has such."' Prosser did not disclose his
reasoning for this conclusion, nor did he analyze business entities'
right of privacy in terms of his four categories. Since Prosser catego-
rized the rights, many courts have adopted Prosser's classifications.'
Furthermore, courts that have addressed the application of the right
of privacy to business entities have agreed iith Prosser's conclusion
and refused to extend the right of privacy to business entities.7
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* Associate, Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, Los Angeles, California. B.A., 1979, Stan-
ford University; J.D., 1982, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. For cases that have dealt with a right of privacy in varying contexts see Nixon v.
Administration of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
3. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). See infra note 10 and accompanying
text.
4. Id. at 408-09.
5. "Business entities" as used in this article means corporations, partnerships, business
associations, business trusts and other independent business groups.
6. C. GREGORY, J. KALVEN, JR. & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
1136 (1977) (citing, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1969); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan. 201, 531 P.2d 1 (1975)). Prosser's categories also
form the basis for the discussion of privacy in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§652A-652L. (1976).
7. Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 878, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366
(1980) (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 815 (4th ed. 1971) which
repeats verbatim the sentence quoted in the text from Prosser, Privacy, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 408-09 (1960) at text accompanying note 3, supra). See United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
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However, in 1980 two separate three-judge panels of the Cali-
fornia Courts of appeal reached different conclusions regarding the
right of privacy for business entities. One court held that a business
entity has no right of privacy,9 while the other court found that a
partnership has a right of privacy.' The California Supreme Court
has not resolved the apparent conflict between these two decisions.
This article suggests a resolution to the conflict between the two
cases by using Prosser's four right of privacy categories. The article
concludes that the courts should recognize a right of privacy for busi-
ness entities in only the public disclosure of private facts category
because this category involves pecuniary damage to business reputa-
tion rather than merely harm to personal feelings. This conclusion
also resolves the conflicting California Court of Appeal cases.
I. PROSSER'S FOUR CATEGORIES AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES
In his article, Prosser enumerated four distinct types of privacy
rights: 1) intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff; 3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation, for the defendant's ad-
vantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.10 The right of privacy in
each of these categories protects a distinct interest of the plaintiff.
However, Prosser, in concluding that corporations and partnerships
have no right of privacy, did not analyze the application of the pri-
vacy right to business entities in the context of each category. Rather,
in a section of the article entitled "Common Features," he simply
stated his conclusion."
In reassessing the application of privacy rights to business enti-
ties, the first inquiry must be whether the protection of any of the
four categories of privacy is necessary. If existing statutory and case
law adequately protects business entities' rights in the areas covered
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); CNA Financial Corp. v. Local 743, 515 F. Supp. 942, 946 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 526, 177 S.W. 2d 369, 370-71 (1944);
Dauer & Fittipaldi, Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communications, Inc., 43 A.D.2d 178, 349
N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1973); Commonwealth Packel v. Shults, 26 Pa. Commw. 129, 362 A.2d
1129, 1135 (1976); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 54 (1942).
8. Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1980).
9. H & M Assoc. v. City of El Centro, 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1980).
10. Prosser, supra note 3, at 389.
11. Prosser, supra note 3, at 408-09.
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by Prosser's four categories, then the expansion of privacy rights to
business entities would not be justified.12
In his article, Prosser hinted that a business entity's right of
privacy already appeared to be adequately protected by other laws in
at least one category. Although noting that corporations and partner-
ships have no right to privacy, Prosser admitted that "either may
have an exclusive right to the use of its name which may be pro-
tected upon some other basis such as that of unfair competition." 18
Prosser's reference to the exclusive right of a business entity to use
its own name addresses the "appropriation" category of privacy.
This category seeks to protect the exploitation of the attributes of the
plaintiff's identity. In addition to state unfair competition laws, there
are also federal trademark laws which protect against appropria-
tion.1 Therefore, because a well-developed body of law protecting
business entities in this area already exists, the courts should not
expand the "appropriation" privacy right to business entities.
Corporations and other business entities are also protected in
the false light area of privacy by other legal remedies. The false light
privacy right provides a cause of action for persons placed in a false
light in the public eye.1 5 However, the law of defamation, which
already provides business entities with a cause of action, overlaps
significantly with the false light privacy cause of action.1 Moreover,
if there is improper use of a corporate name by another, the corpora-
tion may be able to utilize trademark or unfair competition laws.17
While defamation, trademark, and unfair competition laws may not
provide all the coverage of the false light privacy cause of action,
they provide significant protection to business entities, and expansion
of the false light cause of action is not warranted.
12. Courts have been reluctant to extend the right of privacy to areas where other
known causes of action exist. In Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W. 2d 510
(1943), the court refused to find a right privacy in a situation where a cause of action for
slander existed. The court stated:
It is apparent that such [a privacy] right of action is restricted to matters pecu-
liarly personal, private, seclusive, as distinguished from such wrongs as libel,
slander, trespass or injury to property, assault, etc., for which there are other
legal remedies . . . .In no event, however, was such [a privacy] right ever in-
tended as a substitute or an alternative remedy for the invasion or violation of
rights for which other known and established remedies are available.
Id. at 350-51, 174 S.W. 2d at 512.
13. Prosser, supra note 3, at 409.
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1983); in particular see 15 U.S.C. §1125 (false descrip-
tions or representation of goods or services specifically prohibited).
15. Prosser, supra note 3, at 398.
16. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 745-46 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Id. at 954-62; see also id. at 924-26.
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The third privacy category is intrusion. This allows the plaintiff
to sue based upon intrusion on one's physical solitude. This cause of
action also protects against wiretapping or peering into windows."
Although business entities do not generally have protection in this
area, upon examination, they may not need such protection. In re-
fusing to allow business entities a cause of action for invasion of pri-
vacy in general, courts look to the purpose of the privacy right. The
privacy right is designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of
human beings. A business entity does not possess these characteris-
tics." The archetypal intrusion case is a peeping tom or a wiretap.
As applied to a business entity, these acts do not seem to cause ac-
tionable harm. A business entity is not "humiliated" by having a
stranger overhear private conversations or see private acts. Thus,
mere intrusion does not cause a business entity the type of embar-
rassment against which the privacy right seeks to protect. However,
as soon as private matters are disclosed to the public, the business
entity may suffer damages.
Privacy protection seems most necessary for business entities
where there is a disclosure of private facts. This fourth category in-
volves the public disclosure of objectionable facts about a person.
There is no overlap here with defamation since this privacy right
prevents disclosure of private facts and does not involve falsehood.
Moreover, the disclosure category protects more than mere feelings,
and thus may properly be applied to business entities.
II. INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE DISCLOSURE BRANCH OF
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The paradigm for disclosure cases is that involving the public
disclosure of private debts. An analysis of two such leading cases
indicates that the disclosure privacy right protects more than just
"feelings;" it also protects pecuniary interests. In Biederman's of
Springfield, Inc. v. Wright,20 Donald and Daisy Wright, husband
and wife, bought merchandise from Biederman's furniture store. The
Wrights made some payments on the merchandise, but left an upaid
balance. Biederman's claimed that the unpaid balance was due, but
18. Id. at 807-09.
19. Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 878, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361,
365-66 (1980); Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 526, 177 S.W.2d 369, 370-71.
(1944); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 54 (1942); see also City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal.
3d 259, 268, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-8, 466 P.2d 225, 231-32 (1970).
20. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). Prosser cites this case in his article as an
example of the disclosure right of privacy. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 393 n.87.
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the Wrights refused to pay because they said Biederman's had not
properly credited their previous payments. Subsequently, on three
separate occasions, one of Biederman's agents went to the restaurant
where Daisy Wright worked as a waitress and demanded in a loud,
overbearing manner that Daisy pay the balance. On one of the occa-
sions, the agent spoke the following words: "Something is going to be
done with [sic] I am here-I think you're deadbeats-I don't think
you intended to pay for the furniture when you got it."'
Eventually, Biederman's sued the Wrights for the balance alleg-
edly due. The Wrights filed a counterclaim against Biederman's for
breach of their right of privacy based on the agent's public disclosure
of private facts concerning the Wrights' debts. Among the allegations
in the counterclaim, the Wrights claimed that the agent's disclosure
reflected poorly on the Wrights' integrity and damaged their busi-
ness reputation causing them to lose their jobs. 2
The court held that the pleadings, which included the allega-
tions involving the damage to the Wrights' reputation in the business
community, stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The
court also cited the Restatement of the Law of Torts: "In some as-
pects [the right of privacy] is similar to the interest in reputation,
which is the basis of an action for defamation, since both interests
have relation to opinions of third persons."' 8 The Biederman's court
sought to protect the pecuniary interest of the Wrights as well as
their humiliation from the agent's disclosure of private facts. Impor-
tantly, business entities, as well as individuals, have pecuniary inter-
ests which can be protected from public disclosure of private facts.
In Brents v. Morgan,'4 the appellee, W.R. Morgan, a veterina-
rian, was delinquent in his account to the appellant, owner and
21. 322 S.W.2d at 895.
22. The Wrights' counterclaim included the following allegations:
[The agent's conduct] also caused special damages to (Daisy's] reputation
and conduct of her waitress work since it reflected on her integrity, and her
calling as a waitress required integrity.
As a result of [the agent's] conduct on the three said occasions, [Donald]
was required by his employer, the Rose Exterminator Company in Springfield,
Missouri, to cease working in the Springfield, Missouri area where he had pre-
viously worked for said company. . . . [The words of the agent describing the
Wrights as deadbeats] in turn reflected on [Donald's] credit and integrity as a
salesman for the Rose Exterminator Company and by reason of the said words,
this defendant was injured in his good name and reputation as a salesman.
Id. at 894-95.
23. Id. at 896.
24. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). This case is also cited by Prosser as an example
of the disclosure category. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 392 n.84.
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operater of an auto garage. The appellant placed a five-foot by
eight-foot sign in his window stating: "Dr. W.R. Morgan owes an
account of $49.67. And if promises would pay an account, this ac-
count would have been paid long ago. This account will be adver-
tised as long as it remains unpaid.'' 5 Morgan sued the appellant
alleging the publication had "caused him great mental pain, humili-
ation, and mortification . . . tended to expose him to public con-
tempt, ridicule, aversion, and disgrace and . . . caused an evil opin-
ion of him in the minds of tradesmen and the public generally, all to
his damage in the sum of $5,000 .... "",
The court entered judgment in favor of Morgan based on a
right of privacy theory.' 7 Although the component of humiliation
was present, the pleading suggests that an element of damage to bus-
iness reputation was also involved. As the opinion states, Morgan
specifically pleaded that an evil opinion was formed in the minds of
tradespeople." ' By such pleading, Morgan sought damages on the
theory that the disclosure of the private fact hurt his ability to con-
duct business in the town. If Morgan's mental state had been the
only critical factor, the court probably would not have recited the
facts involving damage to business reputation in the opinion.
In both Biederman's and Brents, the courts applied the disclos-
ure branch of the right of privacy to protect both the pecuniary in-
terests and the feelings of the individuals. Although business entities
do not have "feelings", the entities have pecuniary interests which
may require protection. The disclosure privacy right provides a
means by which business entities can achieve such protection.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
BRANCH OF PRIVACY TO THE CONFLICTING CALIFORNIA CASES
In Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson," the California
Court of Appeal heard an action involving Ion Equipment Corpora-
tion's ("Ion") claim for invasion of privacy under the common law
and under the California penal statute which prohibits the electronic
recording of confidential communications.80 Nelson81 recorded a con-
25. 221 Ky. at 766, 299 S.W. at 968.
26. Id. at 766-67, 299 S.W. at 968.
27. Id. at 766, 299 S.W. at 968.
28. Id. at 774, 299 S.W. at 971.
29. 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1980).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632, 637.2 (West 1970 and Supp. 1983).
31. Nelson was the plaintiff in a previous case against Ion Equipment Corporation and
was successful in that action against Ion for monies due under an employment contract. Nelson
[Vol. 24
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versation with an Ion employee without the employee's knowledge or
permission. Ion based its claim for invasion of privacy on this unau-
thorized recording. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's deci-
sion to sustain Nelson's demurrer on the common law privacy cause
of action. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court
held that a corporation does not have a right of privacy."'
Furthermore, the court stated that "there are no California
cases recognizing that a corporation enjoys the right of privacy. Con-
sequently, no case law exists indicating that a corporation has a via-
ble cause of action for invasion of privacy."38
Despite the Ion court's statement that no California case recog-
nizes a corporate right of privacy, the Fourth District of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal had issued an opinion two months earlier find-
ing a right of privacy for a business entity. In H & M Associates v.
City of El Centro," the plaintiff, H & M Associates (H & M), a
limited partnership, operated a 306 unit apartment complex in El
Centro (the City).85 H & M had obtained mortgages on the apart-
ment complex from several financial institutions." These institu-
tions, as well as the City, knew that H & M was waiting for an
approval on financing from the FHA.8 7 On September 16, 1975, the
obtained a writ of execution for use in enforcing his judgment. Prior to obtaining this writ,
Nelson engaged in and recorded a telephone conversation with an Ion employee. Ion then sued
Nelson claiming invasion of privacy under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632 (West 1970 & Supp.
1983), as well as for abuse of process for the use of the writ prior to disposition of Ion's
appeal. 110 Cal. App. 3d 875, 882-83, 168 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368.
32. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 878-79, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 366. In reaching its conclusion the
court stated:
It is generally agreed that the right to privacy is one pertaining only to individu-
als, and that a corporation cannot claim it as such. (Prosser, Torts. . .(4th ed.)
§ 117, p. 815.) This is because the tort is of a personal character "concern[ing]
one's feelings and one's own peace of mind." (City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v.
Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 [85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225, 37 A.L.R. 3d
1313]; see also, Fairfield v. American Photocopy etc. Co. (1955) 138 Cal. App.
2d 82 [291 P.2d 194].) A corporation is a fictitious person and has no "feelings"
which may be injured in the sense of the tort. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 366.
Id. Despite its ruling on the common law privacy cause of action, the appellate court overruled
the demurrer to the cause of action based on California Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2
which forbid electronic eavesdropping. The court cited section 632(b) which defines "person"
to include corporations as perpetrators of the forbidden eavesdropping. Given this definition,
the court reasoned that the legislature also intended the corporations to be protected under the
statute. Id. at 879, 168, Cal. Rptr. at 366.
33. Id. at 878-79, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
34. 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1980).
35. Id. at 404, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
36. d.
37. Id.
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City terminated the water service to the H & M apartment complex
without notifying H & M, without giving H & M a hearing, and
without giving H & M the opportunity to pay the apartment's water
accounts." After terminating the water service, the City's manager
telephoned the institutional mortgagees, the FHA, the local newspa-
per and several other government agencies informing those entities
that the water service had been terminated at the H & M apartment
complex and that the service would not be reinstated." H & M al-
leged that the City's action caused it (H & M) to lose tenants and to
eventually default on its payments.40 The City was able to buy the
apartment complex at a bargain price at the foreclosure sale.
H & M claimed that the City had intended such a result when
terminating the water service. 1 Among other causes of action, H &
M pleaded a cause of action against the City for invasion of privacy
for disclosing private facts to the public.4 ' The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.48 H & M ap-
pealed, and the court of appeal subsequently reversed.4" In its opin-
ion the court thoroughly discussed the privacy rights of business
entitites."
The court in H & M Associates concluded that a partnership
has a right to privacy.46 In reaching this conclusion, the court ana-
lyzed the rights of partnerships and corporations, and held that the
distinction between partnerships and individuals and their respective
rights to privacy was a distinction without a difference.4




42. Id. at 403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
43. Id. at 404, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
44. Id. at 403, 413, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 395, 401.
45. Id. at 409-412, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399-401.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 410, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399. The court stated:
Whether corporations or partnerships have a right to privacy is unsettled. There
have been general statements to the effect that the right pertains only to individ-
uals and it may not be claimed by any other. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.
1971) §117, p. 815. With reference to a corporation's right to sue for defama-
tion, our high court has recently said: . . . "there is no distinction between the
protectible interest in reputation of corporations and individuals . . . . [11 .
the line between . . . natural persons and corporations is frequently fuzzy and
ill-defined. Various legal considerations have long led to the incorporation of
businesses that are in economic reality but individual proprietorships or part-
nerships. For that additional reason, it seems that for purposes of applying the
First Amendment to defamation claims, the distinction between corporations
and individuals is one without a difference." (Vegod Corp. v. American Broad-
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The right to privacy exists in multiple fact contexts and in
this sense it is amorphous-easy to recognize, but difficult to
define. Plaintiff does not seek damages for hurt feelings because
of "its" right to be left alone for how can a partnership, distinct
from its members, suffer humiliation or embarrassment. Here,
however, the damages requested relate to the partnership's eco-
nomic loss-the real property it owned has been foreclosed.
In the commercial world, businesses, regardless of their le-
gal form, have zones of privacy which may not be legitimately
invaded. Bank customers entitled to privacy are not limited to
individuals. The "California Right to Financial Privacy Act"
includes partnerships and prohibitions against disclosure by
bookkeeping services of information contained in the books or
records of their clients also includes partnerships within the
protected class.
A partnership as an entity distinct from its individual part-
ners is now recognized in various legal settings. Procedurally, it
may sue in its own name and it is a person with recognized
status under the partnership act, bankruptcy, criminal law and
licensing statutes.
In a social context many partnerships acquire a distinct
personality, a composite of characteristics unique to the partner-
ship and different from that of the individual partners. The rep-
utation of prestigious law firms or famous medical clinics
known by the names of now-deceased partners or founders is
the residuum of the cumulative efforts, talents and energies of it
participants over the history of the organization. Damage to the
business reputation of the partnership is recompensed through
an action for defamation, and its economic worth includes good
will.
The increasing concern for privacy rights and its concomi-
tant growth is the recognition of " . . . the accelerating en-
croachment on personal freedom and security caused by in-
creased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary
society." The voters of this state manifested their anxiety by
amending article I, section 1 of our state Constitution to include
among the various "inalienable" rights of "all people" the right
of "privacy." "The new provision's primary purpose is to afford
individuals some measure of protection against this most mod-
ern threat to personal privacy." Although the language in White
casting Companies, Inc. (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 763, 770-71 [160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102,
603 P.2d 14]). The distinction between partnerships and individuals and their
respective rights to privacy, depending upon the nature of the right asserted, is
also a distinction without a difference.
Id. at 410, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
refers to "individuals," there is nothing restrictive in its
rationale.4
The holdings in H & M Associates and Ion Equipment can be
reconciled. In H & M Associates, the court found a right of privacy
for a business entity in a case where disclosure of private facts dam-
aged the pecuniary interest of the business entity. The H & M Asso-
ciates court stressed the economic loss caused to H & M by the dis-
closure. On the other hand, in Ion Equipment, the court found no
right to privacy where there was an intrusion upon the plaintiff's
solitude through the surreptitious recording of a conversation. The
Ion Equipment court emphasized the fact that corporations have no
"feelings" which are humiliated by the intrusion into private affairs.
Neither court analyzed the right of privacy in light of Prosser's
four categories. However, when the decisions are analyzed in light of
those four categories, both decisions can be reconciled. In the Ion
Equipment case, the application of the right of privacy to the plain-
tiff corporation was not appropriate because the corporation had no
feelings harmed by the recording of a private conversation. Further
such a recording already received statutory protection 4' and the ex-
pansion of the common law right of privacy in such a situation was
not necessary. However, in the H & M Associates case, invasion of
the right of privacy involved public disclosure of private facts. In this
situation, the business entity, a partnership, did not have an overlap-
ping legal remedy and needed a cause of action for the invasion of
right of privacy to protect its pecuniary interests rather than any
"feelings."
CONCLUSION
Through the years, the courts have developed a common law of
privacy. Most often the courts have applied the right of privacy
within the four categories identified by Prosser. Generally, the courts
have concluded that business entities have no right to privacy be-
cause such entities have no "feelings" which can be protected from
an invasion of privacy. Although this rationale justifies the refusal to
apply the right of privacy to business entities within some of Pros-
ser's categories, the rationale does not justify the refusal to apply the
disclosure of private facts right of privacy to business entities where
a pecuniary interest of a business entity has been damaged by such a
48. Id. at 409-11, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400 (citations omitted).
49. See supra note 32.
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disclosure. The California court of appeal has implicitly recognized a
privacy cause of action for business entities when private facts are
disclosed to the public causing pecuniary damage. The application of
such a cause of action is exemplified in two apparently conflicting
decisions of the California court of appeal which found no right of
privacy for business entities in a case involving the intrusion category
but found a cause of action for right of privacy for a partnership in
another case involving the disclosure category.

